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DONALDSON v. VAN DE KAMP: CRYONICS,
ASSISTED SUICIDE, AND THE
CHALLENGES OF MEDICAL
SCIENCE
In recent years, advances in medical science have left the legal community
with a wide array of social, ethical, and legal problems previously unimagin-
able.' Historically, legislative and judicial responses to these advances
lagged behind the rapid pace of such developments.2 The gap between the
scientist's question, "Can we do it?," and the lawyer's question, "Should/
may we do it?," is most evident in the field of cryonics, with its technique of
cryonic, or cryogenic, suspension.
In cryonic suspension, a legally dead but biologically viable person is pre-
served at an extremely low temperature until advances in medical science
make it possible to revive the person and implement an effective cure.3 The
terminally ill patient who wishes to benefit from such treatment is faced with
the dilemma that present life must be ceased with hope of future recovery.
As a result, the process challenges our traditional notions of death and the
prospects of immortality while raising a host of concomitant legal
dilemmas.4
1. See, e.g., Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.) (life-sustaining respirator and tubal
feeding system), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 115574
(Tenn. Jun. 1, 1992) (disposition of cryogenically preserved product of in vitro fertilization, or
"frozen embryos"); see also George J. Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 67, 68 (1988) (discussing medical advances since World War II that have challenged the
legal system by confronting our perceived notions about death). See generally George P.
Smith, II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely
Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275 (1989) (discussing how medical
technology has forced society to rethink its traditional view of suicide).
2. See, e.g., Edward J. O'Brien, Note, Refusing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Can We Just
Say No?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 695 n.146 (1992) (compiling statutes which provide
durable powers of attorney for health care).
3. Mitchell v. Roe, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). This case involved a
challenge to the state of California's refusal to grant death certificates and disposition permits
to persons who designated Alcor Life Extension Foundation, Inc. (Alcor), a California corpo-
ration in the business of cryonic suspension, as a donee pursuant to the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act. Id. Noting the absence of any evidence that Alcor's operations posed an actual
threat to the public health, the court upheld the permanent injunction against the state's inter-
ference with disposition of the bodies of persons who designated Alcor to place their bodies in
cryogenic suspension. Id. at 575.
4. See id. at 575-76. In Mitchell, the defendant-appellants, the California Department of
Health Services (DHS), posed the following questions:
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Some facets of this dilemma are exemplified by Donaldson v. Van de
Kamp.5 In Donaldson, Thomas A. Donaldson sought the declaration of a
constitutional right to premortem cryonic suspension of his body and the
assistance of others in achieving that state.6 Donaldson, a forty-six-year-old
mathematician and computer software scientist, suffers from a malignant
brain tumor that was diagnosed by his physicians in 1988.' This tumor is
inoperable and continues to grow and invade his brain tissue.8 Donaldson's
condition will gradually deteriorate into a persistent vegetative state and will
ultimately result in death.9 Physicians predict his probable death by August
1993.10
Donaldson petitioned the California courts, seeking a declaration that he
had a constitutional right to achieve cryonic suspension before his natural
death.'" His doctors believe that if Donaldson waits until his natural death
to be suspended, future reanimation will be futile because the tumor will
have destroyed his brain.' 2 In addition, Donaldson's doctors sought an in-
junction against criminal prosecution for their participation in the suspen-
sion, because Donaldson, once suspended, would be considered "dead"
Should cryonically suspended people be considered "dead" or should a separate cate-
gory of "suspended" people be created? How should such people be registered in
official records? . . . [W]hat would happen to [the] estate and assets if and when
cryonic suspension is successful and the decedent is restored to life? Whose identity
is the person to assume or be assigned and what of the record of the person's death?
Alcor also stores body parts, such as human heads and hands. In such cases, whose
identity will the suspended heads and hands assume upon their restoration; the iden-
tity of the original owner of the body part or the identity of the new body to which
the body part will be attached?
Id. (quoting DHS). The California Court of Appeals responded:
These are, of course, but a few of the presently imaginable conundrums which could
arise should Alcor at some future time actually succeed in reviving the currently
dead. Nonetheless, we are confident that those persons who will then head our vari-
ous branches of government will be far wiser than we and entirely capable of resolv-
ing such dilemmatic issues without our assistance.
Id. at 576; see also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECT OF CRYONICS: PROS-
PECTS FOR IMMORTALITY 30-35 (1983) (discussing a hypothetical case that explores the legal
conundrnms that could arise under the division of an estate following the "decedent's" cryonic
suspension).
5. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
6. Id. at 61.
7. Id. at 60-61; Cynthia Gorney, Frozen Dreams: A Matter of Death and Life, WASH.
POST, May 1, 1990, at Dl.
8. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60.
9. Id. at 60-61.
10. Id. at 61.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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under California law. '3
Donaldson and his doctors built their novel argument upon the recent
right-to-die cases in which the courts recognized a patient's right to have
life-sustaining medical treatment withdrawn. 4 Donaldson argued that his
right to privacy and self-determination is paramount to any state interest in
maintaining life.' 5 Thus, according to Donaldson, balancing the state's ab-
stract interest in the preservation of life against Donaldson's compelling rea-
sons to end-or "interrupt," as cryonics enthusiasts would have it-his own
life was not necessary. 16
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion, and Donaldson appealed to the California Court of Appeals. "7 Because
the cryonic process would necessarily involve physician-assisted death, or
the aiding, advising, or encouraging of another to commit suicide, the appel-
late court affirmed the ruling of the trial court, holding that Donaldson did
not have a constitutional right to assisted death."8 Additionally, in light of
Donaldson's First Amendment challenge to the statute, the court upheld the
criminal statute prohibiting the aiding, advising, or encouraging of another
to commit suicide. 19
This Note briefly discusses the process of cryonic suspension and explores
the holding of Donaldson in light of the underlying rationale of the Califor-
nia right-to-die cases. Considering the contradictory state and individual in-
terests balanced in the right-to-die cases, this Note concludes that, under a
similar balancing test, premortem cryonic suspension could be permitted
under certain circumstances; however, the right to premortem cryonic sus-
pension may be more effectively recognized through legislation.
I. CRYONIC SUSPENSION: AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROCESS
Cryonic suspension has its origins in the field of cryobiology, which stud-
13. Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1992). "An individual
who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or
(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead."
Id. § 7180(a).
14. See Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Barber v. Superior Court,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
15. Donaldson, 4 Cal Rptr. 2d at 61.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 64.
19. Id. at 64-65; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988) ("Every person who deliber-
ately aids, or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony.").
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ies the effects of low temperatures on living organisms.2" Although medical
research into the clinical uses of hypothermia dates back to Hippocrates,2 1
the term "cryobiology" was not developed until the 1950s when biologists
needed a term to describe their experiments with low temperatures.22 Since
the 1950s, cryobiologists have experimented with the preservation of living
cells through freezing and have made great strides towards realizing their
ultimate goal, a "cryobank" filled with body parts ready for transplant.23
Considering that an estimated sixty percent of human hearts and ninety per-
cent of livers available for transplant are discarded and never used because
the technology of cryopreservation has yet to be perfected,24 the potential
benefit of such a technology is immense. Although the technology of cry-
opreservation is still in its infancy, cryonicists aspire to expand and to apply
the developments in cryobiology to human body suspension.25
Cryonicists believe that human body suspension is possible because death
is not an instantaneous event. 26 "Total death" is a gradual process whereby
the body drifts through a series of stages.27 "These stages include clinical
death, when spontaneous heartbeat and respiration cease, brain death, when
all sections of the brain are deprived of oxygen, biological death, when the
brain is no longer active and, finally, cellular death when all organs and cells
cease functioning.",28 Because the majority of states define "legal death" as
either clinical death or brain death,29 the ideal time to achieve cryonic sus-
20. STEADMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 375 (25th ed. 1990).
21. SMITH, supra note 4, at 7 ("[tlhe writings of Hippocrates discuss the control of hem-
morage [sic] by use of local cold and, during the Napoleonic Wars, medical literature records
successful instances of local hypothermia to ease and deaden pain when amputations were
performed.").
22. Id. at 8. Post World War II breakthroughs include the successful preservation of frog
sperm in a partially frozen solution by a French biologist in 1946, and the successful preserva-
tion of fowl sperm at a low temperature by an English scientist in 1948. Id. at 7. Thereafter,
the fowl sperm was successfully used for fertilization. Id.
23. See Paul Bagne & Nancy Lucas, Souls on Ice, Cryo Science, OMNI, Oct. 1986, at 116,
162. Cryobiologists hope someday to have a long-term organ bank of hearts, livers, and kid-
neys. Id. at 118, 162-63; see also SMITH, supra note 4, at 8 (discussing the United States Navy
Tissue Bank, founded in 1950 as a massive effort to freeze-dry human tissue for clinical use).
24. See Carol Kahn, On Ice, HEALTH, Mar. 1987, at 70, 74-75 (quoting Dr. Gregory
Fahy, a cryobiologist at the American Red Cross transplantation laboratory in Bethesda,
Md.); see also Bagne & Lucas, supra note 23, at 118. Cryobiologists have had some success in
preserving kidneys using the perfusion method. Id. at 161.
25. See ARLENE SHESKIN, CRYONiCs: A SOCIOLOGY OF DEATH AND BEREAVEMENT 14-
15 (1979).
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 360 (Supp. 1992) (noting
that twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Determina-
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pension is immediately after a person is pronounced legally dead yet prior to
biological or cellular death.3 °
Once a patient is pronounced legally dead, cryonic suspension begins by
reducing the person's body temperature with ice. 3 1 Because seventy-five per-
cent of the weight of the human body is water, which expands when it is
frozen, precautionary measures are required to insure that the body cells do
not burst upon freezing. 32 This is achieved by the perfusion method of in-
ternment, "the linchpin for successful cryonic suspension.", 33 In this proce-
dure, a protective chemical solution is pumped through the patient's
bloodstream to ensure ice crystals do not form on the inside of the cells.
34
Once the perfusion is completed, the patient is wrapped in a heavy-duty foil
and encapsulated in a giant steel tank.35 Long-term storage is maintained by
placing the body in liquid nitrogen, reducing the body temperature to -196
degrees Celsius (-320 degrees Fahrenheit), allowing the body to remain in a
near perfect state of preservation, or suspended animation.
36
Cryonic suspension has been dramatized as science fiction on television
and in motion pictures,37 and popularized by contemporary personalities
tion of Death Act); see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180(c) (West Supp. 1992)
(noting California's adoption of the Uniform Determination of Death Act).
30. See SHESKIN, supra note 25, at 15-16. See generally George P. Smith, II, Cryonic
Suspension and the Law, 17 OMEGA J. DEATH & DYING 1, 4-5 (1986-87) (discussing the phe-
nomenon of death and the problems that could arise under the current statutory definition of
death if a person were to undergo cryonic suspension premortem).
31. SHESKIN, supra note 25, at 16.
32. SMITH, supra note 4, at 9.
33. Id.
34. Id. This protective chemical, a combination of glycerol and dimethyl sulfoxide, ab-
sorbs ninety percent of the cells' water, assuring that the formation of ice crystals will occur on
the outside of the cell, not the inside. Id.; see SHESKIN, supra note 25, at 17.
35. SHESKIN, supra note 25, at 17. The capsule, referred to by some cryonicists as the
"Forever Flask," is a giant thermos bottle, eight feet tall and thirty-one inches in diameter, and
comes equipped with a removable top. Id. See also Gorney, supra note 7, at D6 (describing a
cryogenic suspension tank as a "giant steel thermos").
36. SMITH, supra note 4, at 9. This is the temperature of liquid nitrogen. Id. at 12 n.25.
37. See FOREVER YOUNG (Warner Bros. 1992) (depicting a story in which a test-pilot, in
despair after an accident that leaves his fiancee in a coma, volunteers in 1939 to be cryogeni-
cally suspended as part of a science experiment; he is brought back to life in 1992 discovering
romance once again); SLEEPER (United Artists 1973) (depicting a story in which a character
played by Woody Allen is sealed in aluminum foil and placed in suspended animation after
complications arise in an appendectomy; two hundred years later he is unwrapped to discover
that the world has changed.); L.A. Law: The Good Human Bar (NBC television broadcast,
Jan. 4, 1990) (discussed in Gorney, supra note 7, at D6). The L.A. Law episode, remarkably
similar to the Donaldson case, involved a young woman suffering from cancer who petitioned
the court seeking cryogenic suspension before her rapidly growing tumor began to severely
affect her brain.
JUDGE: But you realize, if I grant your request, and even if this technology comes
true in a hundred years, you'll never see [your friends and family] again.
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and the media.3" Despite the fact that the technology to reanimate a frozen
human body has yet to be developed, several hundred American men and
women have requested, and in some cases undergone, cryonic suspension.39
These individuals place their faith in the technology of the future, i.e., that
someday physicians and scientists will be able to thaw suspended people and
repair their ailments before bringing them back to life."
Most members of the scientific community view this small but active
group of cryonicists as "more of a religious group than one with scientific
leanings."'" Although living creatures, such as insects and certain variety of
frogs, have been frozen and brought back to life, current scientific technol-
ogy is far from that necessary to reanimate human life.42 It is against this
background that Thomas Donaldson petitioned the California courts, seek-
ing the declaration that he had a constitutional right to seek cryonic suspen-
sion before his imminent death from natural causes.
II. PRIOR LAW
Donaldson based his complaint on the underlying rationale of the Califor-
PAULA: I know that. But they will forever remind me of what this world has to
offer. And that's why I'm here: I'm not asking you for death. I'm begging you for
my last chance at life.
Gorney, supra note 7, at D6 (quoting L.A. Law: The Good Human Bar).
38. See Carol Cioe, Disney on Ice, ESQUIRE, Jan. 1985, at 48 (noting that, despite rumors,
Walt Disney's body is not frozen); Kahn, supra note 24, at 75 ("'Walt was cremated and his
ashes are in Forest Lawn Cemetery.' So it looks like Disney, at least, will never get re-
animated."); see also Bernie Lincicome, A Few Bear Flaws Need Correcting, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
30, 1991, § 3 at 1:
For the Bears to get from here to there, from where they are to where the Bills are,
which is in the fast lane to the Super Bowl, a few small adjustments may be neces-
sary. Most obvious, of course, is to put Stan Thomas, the rookie tackle, into cryo-
genic suspension, thawing him out in, oh, 1996 or '97 when the Bears are either good
enough to overcome his blunders or bad enough so that they don't make any
difference.
39. Gorney, supra note 7, at D6. Inspired by Robert Ettinger's 1964 book, The Prospect
of Immortality, cryonic societies were established across the country to promote education,
research, organization, and action in the field of cryonics. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 15-19;
SHESKIN, supra note 25, at 12-14 (discussing the advent of the cryonics movement).
40. Gorney, supra note 7, at Dl. Because the most critical organ to be frozen is the brain,
cryonicists believe that it may be necessary to suspend only the brain since future technology
may develop a way to force cells to replicate themselves for the production of body parts. Id.
Thus, some cryogenic suspension patients opt for "neurosuspension" instead of "whole body
suspension." Id. Indeed, neurosuspension has its economic advantages as it costs considerably
less--35,000 compared with $100,000 for "whole body suspension." Id. at D6.
41. Id. at D6 (quoting John Baust, past president of the Society for Cryobiology and
director of the Center for Cryobiological Research at State University of New York in
Binghamton).
42. See id. ("The extrapolation from insect to human is very difficult to make.").
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nia right-to-die cases, which recognize that a patient's right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment included the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment.43 Donaldson argued that, similar to the patient's interests in the
right-to-die cases, his interest in seeking to achieve cryonic suspension out-
weighs the countervailing state interests at issue.44
A. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health :4 Clarifying
the Legal Basis for a Patient's Right To Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment
The right-to-die cases are grounded in the common law doctrine of in-
formed consent.46 This doctrine embodies the principle of bodily integrity
that holds that the touching of an individual without consent or legal justifi-
cation constitutes a battery.47 The "logical corollary" of the doctrine of in-
formed consent is that a patient possesses the right not to consent to
treatment.48
In the seminal case Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
Supreme Court discussed the common law and constitutional foundations of
the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.49 While various state courts
43. Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); see Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
44. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61.
45. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id. Justice Cardozo, while serving for the New York Court of Appeals, noted that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's con-
sent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Soci-
ety of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
48. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. In some exceptional cases a patient may be forced to accept
treatment, when the state's interest in protecting innocent third parties (usually minor chil-
dren) outweighs the patient's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Application of President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.) (ordering lifesaving
blood transfusion for mother of infant child), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). "The patient,
25 years old, was the mother of a seven month old child. The state, as parens patriae, will not
allow a parent to abandon a child, and so it should not allow this ultimate of voluntary aban-
donments." Id. See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 306 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-79. Nancy Cruzan's parents sought a court order di-
recting the withdrawal of their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equipment. Id. at
265. The limited issue before the Court was whether the U.S. Constitution prohibited Mis-
souri from requiring clear and convincing evidence that Nancy, rendered incompetent as a
result of a severe automobile accident, would have chosen to withdraw the hydration and
nutrition equipment. Id. at 280. Although the Court only assumed, for purposes of the case,
that the U.S. Constitution granted a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration, id. at 279, the dicta is instructive in analyzing the legal basis for the
right-to-die cases.
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had previously held that the right to refuse unwanted treatment is protected
by a generalized constitutional right to privacy,"° the Cruzan majority re-
jected that theory as the basis for the right-to-die cases.5" The Court found
that the issue is more properly analyzed under the terms of a protected lib-
erty interest found in the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Regardless of whether
a patient's right to refuse treatment is derived from a constitutional right to
privacy, a protected liberty interest, or the common law doctrine of in-
formed consent, the courts balance the individual's interests against the rele-
vant state interests. 53
B. California Right-To-Die Case Law
Three leading California right-to-die cases attempted to clarify the bound-
aries of a recognized right to die without opening the Pandora's box of rec-
ognizing a limited right to assisted suicide.
1. Affirmative Act Versus Omission
The first California case to recognize that the patient's right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment encompassed the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment was Barber v. Superior Court.54 In Barber, two doctors who had
disconnected a patient's life sustaining respirator at the request of the pa-
tient's family sought a writ of prohibition against prosecution for murder.55
Although the court recognized a patient's fundamental right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, 56 the court ultimately decided the case by characterizing the
doctors' conduct as that of an omission rather than an affirmative act." The
cessation of "heroic" life support measures was viewed not as an affirmative
act amounting to unlawful conduct, but analogous to withholding a manu-
50. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977);
Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
51. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7; but see In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9-10 (Fla. 1990)
(post-Cruzan case relying on state constitutional right of privacy as basis for finding a right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment).
52. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7.
53. See id.; see also infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text discussing the relevant state
interests at issue in the right-to-die cases.
54. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
55. Id. at 486. Three days following a cardio-respiratory arrest, the patient fell into a
deep comatose state leaving him in a permanent vegetative state. At the request of the family,
the respirator and other life sustaining equipment were removed. The patient died thereafter.
Id.
56. Id. at 489-90.
57. See id. at 490.
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ally-administered injection or medication.58 Because the doctors' conduct
involved the failure to act, the issue was whether they had a legal duty to
continue to provide life-sustaining treatment.59
The court held that the "omission" of continued treatment was not an
unlawful failure to perform a legal duty, and that the doctors could not be
prosecuted for murder." By characterizing the doctors' actions as an omis-
sion, the court found it unnecessary to address the vexing question of
whether the doctors' conduct was in fact the proximate cause of the patient's
ultimate death.61
2. Balancing the Competing State and Individual Interests
Subsequent to the Barber decision, the California courts have expanded
and clarified the right of a patient to have unwanted life-sustaining treatment
withdrawn. Bartling v. Superior Court62 involved a competent, seventy-
year-old man who suffered from emphysema, chronic respiratory failure, ar-
teriosclerosis, an abdominal aneurysm, and a malignant tumor of the lung.
63
Mr. Bartling petitioned the court to have his life-sustaining ventilator re-
moved." The court held that the right to have life-sustaining medical equip-
ment withdrawn was not limited to comatose, terminally-ill patients or
representatives acting on their behalf.65
In balancing the competing state and personal interests at issue, the court
set forth three compelling state interests:66 the preservation of life, the pre-
vention of suicide, and the maintenance of the ethics of the medical profes-
sion. 67 Balanced against these interests were the patient's constitutional
right to privacy and:autonomy in medical decisions.68 The court found that
even the most significant state interest, the preservation of life, was out-
weighed by the patient's self-determination of his medical treatment: "[I]f
the right of the patient ... is to have any meaning at all, it must be para-
mount to the interests of the patient's hospital and doctors. The right of a
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 493.
61. Id.
62. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
63. Id. at 220-21.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 223.
66. The court also noted that a fourth interest-the protection of innocent third parties-
was not at issue in this particular case. Id. at 225.
67. Id.; see also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd,
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 424-27 (Mass. 1977); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-25 (N.J. 1985).
68. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25; but see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
1993] .,
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competent adult patient to refuse medical treatment . .. must not be
abridged." 69
The court in Bartling also addressed the assisted suicide issue. The court
concluded that by disconnecting the ventilator, Mr. Bartling's doctors
merely hastened his inevitable death by natural causes, and that the decision
to allow nature to take its course is not the same as enlisting the assistance of
others in committing suicide.7" Thus, the underlying reason for the state's
interest in preventing assisted suicide-the prevention of irrational self-de-
struction-is not implicated where the competent rational decision is made
in the face of impending death when treatment offers no hope.71
3. Motivation of Patient Not at Issue
The final development in the California right-to-die case law was Bouvia v.
Superior Court.72 This case involved a competent, twenty-eight-year-old
quadriplegic woman suffering from cerebral palsy who sought the removal of
her feeding tube.7 3 The trial court refused to grant the requested relief, find-
ing the patient's motives indicative of an attempt to commit suicide with the
state's help.74 Previous right-to-die decisions placed great emphasis on the
fact that the patient did not want to die;75 in such cases, death was the result
of nature's taking its course, not the result of affirmative actions or an intent
to bring about death.76
Despite Ms. Bouvia's previously expressed desire to end her life and her
attempt to starve herself to death, the California Court of Appeals found
that her reason for refusing treatment was irrelevant in the assertion of a
constitutional and common law right.77 In reversing, the court noted that
"[i]f a right exists, it matters not what motivates its exercise."78 Applying
the Bartling balancing test, the court found Ms. Bouvia's interests predomi-
nant and held that the ultimate decision to forego medical treatment was the
patient's alone.79 The fact that Ms. Bouvia was not terminally ill and could
69. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
70. Id. at 225-26.
71. Id. at 226.
72. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
73. Id. at 298-300.
74. Id. at 299, 305.
75. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see
also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
76. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26; see also Satz, 362 So. 2d at 162-63.
77. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300, 305-06. "Overlooking the fact that a desire to termi-
nate one's life is probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy, we find no substantial
evidence to support the court's conclusion." Id. at 306.
78. Id. at 306 (internal quotations omitted).
79. Id. at 304, 306.
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live an additional fifteen to twenty years with the feeding tube was of no
consequence.80 Thus, Bouvia moved the court closer to the realization of the
similarity between disconnecting life-sustaining treatment and assisted
suicide."a
4. Implicit Balancing of the Patient's Quality of Life
Although the Bou via court recognized that Ms. Bouvia could live an addi-
tional fifteen to twenty years on her feeding tube, the court balanced the
quality of the patient's life with the benefits of continuing treatment: "[T]he
trial court mistakenly attached undue importance to the amount of time pos-
sibly available to petitioner, and failed to give equal weight and considera-
tion for the quality of that life; an equal, if not more significant,
consideration." 8 2
This balancing lurks beneath the rationale of all right-to-die cases.83 The
relevant state interests in protecting life and preventing suicide are dimin-
80. Id. at 304.
81. See id. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring) ("I have no doubt that Elizabeth Bouvia
wants to die; and if she had the full use of even one hand, could probably find a way to end her
life-in a word--commit suicide.... [T]he majority opinion here must necessarily 'dance'
around the issue."). The tenuous distinction between the affirmative, death-producing acts
constituting assisted suicide and the passive refusal of medical treatment allowing a patient to
die naturally is illustrated by the case McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). In
McKay, Mr. Bergstedt, a thirty-one-year-old quadriplegic who had been dependent on a respi-
rator since the "tender age of ten," sought an order to have his respirator disconnected. Id. at
620. The court found that the decision to refuse medical treatment was not tantamount to
state-assisted suicide despite the fact that the patient knew that death would imminently follow
and that the refused "treatment" had allowed Mr. Bergstedt to breathe for twenty-three years.
Id. at 625-27. Disconnecting the respirator would merely permit the "natural death" of Mr.
Bergstedt. Id. at 627. The dissent persuasively points out that "after twenty-three years of
living and breathing in this machine-aided manner, the whole process becomes something
quite more than mere medical treatment." Id. at 634 (Springer, J., dissenting). The dissent
goes on to conclude, "[w]hen Kenneth Bergstedt asked the court to give legal sanction to the
death-inducing act of disconnecting his breathing apparatus, he was not to my mind merely
exercising his right to be let alone, and his right to refuse unwanted medical treatment." Id.
(footnote omitted).
82. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
83. See id.; Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). "[Mr.
Bartling] wanted to live but preferred death to his intolerable life on the ventilator." Id. at
223. "'What we consider here is a competent, rational decision to refuse treatment when
death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life.' " (quoting
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n. 11 (Mass. 1977)); see also
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("A more rational
approach involves the determination of whether the proposed treatment is proportionate or
disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be gained versus the burdens caused."). See gener-
ally Smith, supra note 1, at 380-408 (discussing the balancing of the quality of the patient's life
underlying the leading right-to-die cases).
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ished where the benefits of continued treatment are slight. 4 The Bouvia
court recognized that a patient's desire to die in dignity outweighs the state's
interest in preserving life against the will of the sufferer.8" In other words,
this moral and philosophical decision belongs to the patient and not to phy-
sicians, lawyers, judges, or ethics committees.8 6
III. DONALDSON V. VAN DE KAMP :87 REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE A
RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
The Donaldson court rejected the notion that the current right-to-die cases
could be interpreted as recognizing a limited right to assisted suicide.88 The
petitioners argued that in the past courts relied on a "legal fiction" in the
right-to-die cases to avoid the assisted-suicide issue:
As is often true in times of social transition, case law has created
fictions to avoid affronting previously accepted norms. In life sup-
port termination, there is a fiction of medical determinism. Pa-
tients are seen as passive victims of their illness. They do not
choose to die; death overtakes them. 9
The court, however, embraced the idea that a physician's act of discon-
necting life-sustaining equipment is not an affirmative, death producing
act.90 The court noted that "[t]he patient ... who is being kept alive by a
life-support system has taken a detour that usually postpones an immediate
encounter with death. ... [T]he medical treatment has prolonged life and
prevented death from overtaking the patient. Stopping the treatment allows
the delayed meeting with death to take place."'" Nevertheless, the court
found that recognizing a right to pre-mortem cryonic suspension was tanta-
mount to sanctioning assisted suicide.92 Thus, the court held that Donald-
son did not have a constitutional right to state-assisted death.93
The court did note that Donaldson could take his own life with impu-
84. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.
85. Id. at 305.
86. Id.
87. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
88. Id. at 62-64. "Donaldson is asking that we sanction something quite different.... [A]
third person will simply kill Donaldson and hasten the encounter with death. No statute or
judicial opinion countenances Donaldson's decision to consent to be murdered or to commit
suicide with the assistance of others." Id. at 63.
89. Id. (quoting from George J. Alexander, Death by Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
67, 82 (1988)).
90. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
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nity.94 "He makes a persuasive argument that his specific interest in ending
his life is more compelling than the state's abstract interest in preserving life
in general. No state interest is compromised by allowing Donaldson to expe-
rience a dignified death rather than an excruciatingly painful life."" Yet,
the court found that the state maintained a controlling interest in protecting
society from abuses and maintaining social order through the enforcement of
criminal laws.96
Although it delineated the reasons why the state has a compelling interest
in preventing assisted suicide, the court failed to analyze the applicability of
those reasons to the facts of the particular case. Clearly the state had a
compelling interest "to protect the lives of those who wish to live no matter
what their circumstances., 97 The court, however, overlooked the fact that
Donaldson's decision to seek suspension before his natural death was ra-
tional and voluntary.9 In addition, Donaldson's hopes of being reanimated
in the future are diminished if he waits until his natural death from cancer. 99
Because Donaldson's motives were calculated, reasonable, and openly
presented before the court, the "important [state] interest to ensure that peo-
ple are not influenced to kill themselves" was not at issue.100
IV. RECOGNIZING A RIGHT TO PRE-MORTEM CRYONIC SUSPENSION:
BALANCING THE COMPETING STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
Because the Donaldson court refused to interpret the right-to-die cases as
recognizing a limited right to assisted suicide, it did not balance the relevant
state interests with those of Donaldson to end his life and achieve cryonic
suspension.1 However, by realizing that the same competing interests dis-
cussed in the right-to-die cases were at issue in Donaldson, the court could
have employed a similar balancing test and could have held that Donaldson
had a fundamental right to be cryonically suspended before his natural
94. Id. at 63; see also Smith, supra note 1, at 289-9 1. While suicide is not a crime, twenty-
two states classify assisted suicide as a statutory crime. Id. at 290-91 n.106 (compiling
statutes).
95. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Gorney, supra note 7, at D6. "I would not see myself as committing suicide, nor
would the people who froze me see me as committing suicide. They'd see me as going through
a draconian treatment that was my only chance to stay alive, however slim that chance might
be." Id. (quoting Mr. Donaldson).
99. Id.; Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61.
100. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
101. See id. at 63.
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death. In so doing, the court would balance Donaldson's individual interests
in seeking pre-mortem cryonic suspension with the state's general interests
in preserving life, preventing suicide, and maintaining the ethics of the medi-
cal profession. 102
The most significant of the relevant state interests at issue in a right-to-die
case is the preservation of life. 3 The state's interest in the protection and
preservation of human life encompasses two aspects-preserving the sanctity
of all life to society as a whole and the value of the individual's life."° De-
spite the state's compelling interest in preserving human life, a patient's right
of self-determination consistently has been held to predominate in right-to-
die cases.'15 Similarly, Donaldson had a particular and compelling interest
in ending his life.'° 6 It is ironic that eventually Donaldson's condition will
deteriorate to a persistent vegetative state; 107 once this happens Donaldson
will have a right to have his life-sustaining medical equipment withdrawn
and undergo cryonic suspension immediately thereafter.
A final state interest to be considered is the maintenance of the ethical
standards of the medical profession. With the growing emphasis on a pa-
tient's right to privacy and autonomy, the courts have placed less emphasis
on medical ethics as an important state interest.108 However, considering
that the technology of cryonic suspension is still in its infancy, a court
should consider whether allowing a patient to achieve cryonic suspension
before natural death would significantly damage the reputation or ethical
structure of the medical profession. 109 The fact that members of the scien-
tific and medical community do not agree that it is possible to reanimate a
frozen human body weighs significantly against the patient.
The analysis in Donaldson never reached this type of balancing of compet-
102. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
103. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
104. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 2021, 2033 (1992); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
105. See Smith, supra note 1, at 408.
Behind the extended judicial rhetoric of balancing individual privacy interests and
rights of self-determination against countervailing state interests is a highly predict-
able endpoint of judicial reasoning; once it is reasonably understood that one has
chosen to end her life by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, the appellate
courts will respect and uphold this decision as within her common-law right of self-
determination as guaranteed by the right of privacy found within the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
Id.
106. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 60-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
107. See id.
108. Martha A. Matthews, Note, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse
Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 707, 733-35 (1987).
109. See Note, supra note 104, at 2035.
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ing state and individual interests. The characterization of Donaldson's peti-
tion as a request to condone assisted suicide precluded the court from
addressing Donaldson's compelling reasons to seek cryonic suspension
before his natural death. "° Although the court gave lip service to balancing
the countervailing interests,"' its opinion does not inquire into why the
state's general interest in preserving life and preventing irrational self-de-
struction predominate over Donaldson's interest in being cryogenically sus-
pended before his natural death.
V. CONCLUSION
The California right-to-die cases necessarily walk a judicial tightrope in
finding that a patient has a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
without recognizing a right to assisted suicide in limited circumstances. The
Donaldson court rejected the notion that the current right-to-die cases could
be interpreted to allow a patient to achieve cryonic suspension before his
natural death. i12 The court characterized the request as tantamount to phy-
sician-assisted suicide.' 13
Perhaps the most compelling question that the Donaldson court did not
address was whether cryonic suspension is something that should be
done." 4 "[T]he fact that something can be done does not automatically
mean that it should be done. . .. ,"' " It is evident that advances in medical
science such as cryonic suspension will continue to challenge the legal com-
munity with a wide array of social, ethical, and legal problems previously
unimaginable.
The recurring question will be whether a courtroom is an appropriate fo-
rum in which to address these ethical questions. As the Donaldson court
ultimately concluded: "It is unfortunate for Donaldson that the courts can-
not always accommodate the special needs of an individual. We realize that
time is critical to Donaldson, but the legal and philosophical problems posed
by his predicament are a legislative matter rather than a judicial one."' 6
Robert W. Pommer, III
110. See Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
111. See id. at 62 ("To determine whether Donaldson has suffered a violation of his consti-
tutional rights, we must balance his interests against any relevant state interests.").
112. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63.
113. Id.
114. See Dennis J. Doherty, An Ethical Appraisal of Cryonics, U.S.A. TODAY MAG., Jan.
1989, at 73.
115. Id. at 74.
116. Donaldson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
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